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COMMENT
AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES SURROUNDING THE
ENCRYPTION EXPORTATION DEBATE, THEIR
RAMIFICATIONS, AND POTENTIAL RESOLUTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Historically, encryption has been a contest between the "coders"
and the "decoders."' While in the past encrypted messages have been
decrypted with varying degrees of success, it is now possible with mod-
em mathematical algorithms to encrypt messages that without the proper
keys are, for all practical purposes, impossible to crack.2 This situation
ensures the secrecy of military intelligence and also provides important
benefits to those who own such intellectual property as movies or audio
recordings, to financial institutions who want to exchange information
electronically, and to a vast array of corporations and individuals who
want to maintain their proprietary knowledge or trade secrets.' Unfortu-
nately, strong encryption also brings with it the opportunity for misuses
such as terrorism, fraud by organized crime, and spying.4 These potential
1. "Encryption" is the process by which the original text of a message, which is
known as "plaintext" and can be read by humans, is transformed into a text known as
"ciphertext" that the sender and recipient intend to be unintelligible to third parties.
BRUCE SCHNEIER, APPLIED CRYPTOGRAPHY: PROTOCOLS, ALGORITHMS, AND SOURCE CODE
IN C 1 (1994). "Decryption" is the reverse process of encryption that transforms the
ciphertext message into the original plaintext. Id. The transformation process is accom-
plished through the use of mathematical algorithms and keys. Id. at 2. The strength of an
encryption program is determined by the length of its key and the complexity of its al-
gorithm. Id. at 129. Key lengths are measured in bits. Id. Each bit is equal to a binary
digit (either 0 or 1) and every additional bit doubles the strength of the encryption. Id. at
2, 129. So a 128-bit key would require that all 128-bits be correct before the message
could be decrypted and is twice as strong as a 127-bit key.
2. Id. at 7. Using existing technology anyone willing to spend $100,000 would be
able to break a 40-bit key in 2 seconds; a 56-bit key in 35 hours; a 64-bit key in 1 year;
an 80-bit key in 70,000 years; a l12-bit key in 10\] 14 years; and a 128-bit key in 10\] 19
years. Jim Kerstetter, Key Uprising, PC WEEK, Sept. 29, 1997, at 1, 18, available in 1997
WL 12481899.
3. Ira S. Rubinstein, Export Controls On Encryption Software, in COPING WrH U.S.
EXPORT CONTROLS 1996, at 309, 311 (PLI Com. Law and Practice Course Handbook Se-
ries No. A4-4512, 1996).
4. See, e.g., Note, Adam C. Bonin, Protecting Protection: First and Fifth Amend-
ment Challenges to Cryptography Regulation, 1996 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 495, 496 (1996).
See Terrence Stender, Too Many Secrets: Challenges to the Control of Strong Crypto and
the National Security Perspective, 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 287 (1998), for a discus-
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misuses have prompted the federal government to enact laws regulating
encryption.' But while attempting to address these misuses, the current
regulations place too many restrictions upon U.S. companies and reasona-
ble uses and sometimes produce results which are neither logical nor sen-
sible. Complicating the situation are the decisions that have been handed
down by three federal district courts, which are divided as to the consti-
tutionality of the current export regulations in regards to the First
Amendment. Meanwhile, within Congress and the Executive Branch
there is an ongoing debate about whether the current regulations should
be relaxed, and if so, to what degree.
Moreover, while the current U.S. encryption export controls may
promote legitimate government ends, if they are ultimately to be effec-
tive, they must be part of a larger international system. Any unilateral ac-
tion taken by the United States is unlikely to be successful due to the na-
ture of encryption, the ease with which it can be produced and
transported, and the rapid advances occurring in computer technology.
This comment details and analyzes the current export regulations, how
the current U.S. controls are being circumvented, the applicable case law,
and some of the proposed reforms as well as how other nations limit the
exportation of encryption while concluding with a suggested course of
action.
II. CURRENT ENCRYPTION REGULATIONS
Although the import, sale and use of encryption products within the
United States is legal, the exportation of these same products is subject
to government control under the Export Administration Regulations
(EAR).6 The Bureau of Export Administration (BXA) has regulatory ju-
sion of the importance of national security in the encryption debate.
5. Louis Freeh, the Director of the FBI, in testimony before the U.S. Senate Judici-
ary Committee's Technology, Terrorism, and Government Information Subcommittee,
stated that without a national policy on encryption, "our ability to investigate and some-
times prevent the most serious crimes and terrorism will be severely impaired." Bill Pie-
trucha, Computer Industry to Press for Encryption Relief, NEWSBYTES NEWS NETWORK,
Feb. 25, 1998, available in 1998 WL 5030256.
6. Export Administration Regulations, 15 C.F.R. Pt. 730-740 (1998). See, e.g., CARL
MIDDLEHURST, ET AL., Collection of Articles by Carl Middlehurst of Sun Microsystems,
Inc, in 17TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON COMPUTER LAW: THE Evolving Law of the Internet
Commerce, Free Speech, Security, Obscenity and Entertainment, at 549, 553 (PLI Pat-
ents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G4-3987,
1997). The reasoning according to the EAR is that "encryption items can be used to
maintain the secrecy of information, and thereby may be used by persons abroad to harm
national security, foreign policy and law enforcement interests." 15 C.F.R. §742.15
(1998).
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risdiction over the encryption items and activities that are subject to the
EAR.7 The encryption items that are subject to the EAR are defined as
all encryption commodities, software, and technology that contain en-
cryption features. 8 Any individual or company that wants to export
materials containing encryption strength of over 56-bits from one of
these three categories in compliance with the regulations must submit an
export license application to the Department of Commerce. 9 These li-
censes are required for the exportation of encryption items to all destina-
tions except Canada.'0 The BXA then reviews each application for a li-
cense on a case-by-case basis and determines "whether the export or re-
export is consistent with U.S. national security and foreign policy
interests.""I
The encryption regulations that were in place until September, 1998,
permitted the granting of licenses for non-recovery encryption items that
used key lengths of up to 56-bits if they were accompanied by a commit-
ment to develop recoverable items. Without such a promise licenses were
to be granted only for 40-bit key lengths.' 2 Though by demonstrating that
7. 15 C.F.R. §734.2(a)(1) (1998).
8. See 15 C.F.R. §772 (1998).
9. 15 C.F.R. §742.15(a) (1998). See White House Statement on Administration En-
cryption Policy, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL 13605470 (an-
nouncing the increase to 56-bits the encryption strength that can be exported without a li-
cense) (hereinafter White House Statement). See also Transcript of White House Press
Briefing on Encryption, U.S. NEWSWIRE, Sept. 16, 1998, available in 1998 WL 13605481
(hereinafter White House Briefing). See infra text accompanying notes 14-15.
10. 15 C.F.R. §742.15(a) (1998). Canada is excepted from these license require-
ments because under bilateral agreements Canada respects certain U.S. export controls
and will not ship U.S. origin goods to certain countries without appropriate U.S. export
licenses or verification that the specified goods may be exported to that specified country
without the U.S. license, and even then only after the issuance of an individual Canadian
export permit. Andrea F. Rush & Lisa R. Lifshitz, A Canadian Perspective on Interna-
tional Licensing, in LICENSING AGREEMENTS 1998, at 375-76 (PLI Pat., Copyrights, Trade-
marks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G4-4033, 1998) (citing s. 2 of
GEP No. 12, SOR/97-107). The U.S. encryption regulations do not allow licenses to be
granted for exports to Cuba, Libya, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Sudan. 15 C.F.R.
§740.8(c) (1998).
11. 15 C.F.R. §742.15(b) (1998).
12. 15 C.F.R. §742.15(b)(3) (1998). Normally encryption is designed to only permit
the sender and the receiver of the encrypted message to know the "key" that will allow
the message to be decrypted. Key recovery encompasses a variety of techniques that
would enable third parties, such as law enforcement agencies, to also obtain the key and
decrypt the message. This enables keys to be "recovered after they have been lost, mali-
ciously destroyed, or intentionally withheld." Cylink: U.S. Government Licenses Cylink to
Export the Triple-DES Encryption Algorithm World-Wide, M2 PRESSWIRE, May 18, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 12206778 (hereinafter Cylink).
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it could already deliver key recovery, a company could apply for a li-
cense that would permit the exportation of key lengths of up to 128-
bits. 3 However, on the sixteenth of September, 1998, the Clinton admin-
istration officially loosened its position on what level of encryption was
consistent with national security by making an announcement that created
a new policy regarding encryption exportation that became effective im-
mediately.' 4 The new policy allows for the export of key lengths of 56-
bits or less without a license and without a promise to develop key re-
covery after a one-time technical review. 5 Products containing encryption
with key lengths of over 56-bits can not be exported unless they fall
under one of the exceptions.'
6
A. Exceptions That Have Been Permitted
There are normally several exceptions to the EAR's general export
licensing framework, but only some of these are available to products
containing encryption. For example, technology or software products that
either are already publicly available or contain a de minimis level of U.S.
parts normally come within an exception to the EAR. 17 However, prod-
ucts that contain encryption are not eligible for these exceptions.1 8 Never-
theless, in what seems like a contradiction to the above policies, phono
graphic records and most printed matter containing encryption are not
subject to the EAR. 19 This often results in the printed form of an encryp-
tion program being exportable, while the electronic version is not.20
13. See 15 C.F.R. §740.8(b)(1) (1998).
14. See White House Statement, supra note 9 (stating that the new policy "supports
law enforcement and national security" and that it "will protect our national security and
our safety.")
15. Id. In the same announcement the administration also extended an exception
that had originally been created for financial institutions to insurance, medical, and
health-care companies. Id. See infra text accompanying note 31.
16. Id.
17. 15 C.F.R. §734.7(c) (1998) (publicly available exception). 15 C.F.R.
§734.3(b)(3) & 734.4 (1998) (de minimis exception).
18. 15 C.F.R. §732.2(b) & (d), 734.3(b)(3), 734.4(b) (1998).
19. 15 C.F.R. §734.3(b)(2) (1998). Encryption source code that is in electronic form
or media, such as a computer diskette or CD ROM, is still subject to the EAR. 15 C.FR.
§734.3(b)(3) (1998).
20. See Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 974 F.Supp. 1288, 1296 (N.D.
Cal. 1997). See infra notes 68-74 and accompanying text. While printed materials are
currently exportable, the government has stated that it reserves the option to impose con-
trols on encryption source or object code in printed form that is scannable. Bureau of Ex-
port Administration, Encryption Items Transferred From the U.S. Munitions List to the
Commerce Control List (visited June 30, 1998) <http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Encryption/en-
creg.htm>. See infra note 68 for an explanation of object and source code. Due to the
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As stated earlier, the regulations allow for the exportation of encryp-
tion products that would otherwise not be exportable if they contain ei-
ther a key recovery system or are accompanied by a corporate promise to
develop a key recovery system for the product that will support an inter-
national key management infrastructure. 2' Recently, however, the Com-
merce Department has begun to grant licenses to products that do not
contain a key recovery system without obtaining a promise from the cor-
poration to develop key recovery. 22 These licenses have been granted be-
cause they contain other restrictions upon the export products that the
Commerce Department believes will prevent national security and law
enforcement interests from being compromised.23 These restrictions con-
tain such limitations as to which countries and types of business are eli-
gible to obtain the products.
For example, the Commerce Department has been more willing to
grant licenses that allow corporations to export products to a few limited
countries. Hewlett-Packard was permitted to sell technology that uses
128-bit encryption without including a key recovery system, but only to
Britain, Germany, France, Denmark, Australia, and Japan.24 The Com-
merce Department has not publicly stated why exceptions were granted
only for these countries, but likely reasons are that these countries have
encryption controls in place and are close allies of the United States.
While these factors do not ensure that the encryption products will be
used solely for legal purposes, they do decrease the likelihood that the
products will be used for illicit purposes against the United States. 25
However, it is also possible that these exceptions were granted for some
other reason. The uncertainty surrounding why these exceptions were
granted, and whether similar exceptions will be granted in the future, that
makes the application of the regulations by the Commerce Department
susceptible to claims of arbitrariness.
Not only are there license exceptions for specific nations, but the
Commerce Department has also granted license exceptions to certain cor-
porations for the exportation of encryption to banking and financial insti-
First Amendment constitutional issues that the use of this reserved power would raise, it
is unlikely that the government will ever attempt to activate this reserved power.
21. 15 C.F.R. §742.15(b)(3) (1998).
22. See infra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
23. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
24. See, e.g., U.S. Approves HP Encryption Technology Export to Japan, Bus.
DAILY, May 22, 1998, available in 1998 WL 12219855.
25. Encryption controls regulate who is using the encryption product and what the
product can be used for, while being a close ally decreases the motive for a foreign or-
ganization to threaten U.S. national security and law enforcement interests.
1998]
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tutions. For instance, Cylink, a U.S. company, was permitted to export
triple 56-bit encryption to international financial institutions and to sub-
sidiaries of U.S. multinationals without providing for key recovery.26 This
appears to be a concession by the U.S. government to domestic busi-
nesses to allow them to compete in a global market. As William A.
Reinsch, U.S. Under Secretary of Commerce for Export Administration,
stated when the license was announced, "I am pleased we were able to
approve the license allowing Cylink to export their strongest encryption
products to financial institutions and multinational firms around the
world. U.S. companies can and should be able to compete in this rapidly
growing market." 27
On July 7, 1998, the Commerce Department made it easier to sell
encryption software to foreign banks by dropping some of the require-
ments that exporters previously had to satisfy.28 Under these guidelines,
vendors desiring to export encryption only need a one-time product re-
view to sell any bit-length to banks in 45 countries.29 The products need
neither to contain a key recovery system, nor do the exporters have to
promise to develop one.30 Although the July 7 exceptions only applied to
financial institutions, the administration's September 16th announcement
extends the exception to health-care, medical, and insurance companies. 31
While the special exceptions allowed have gradually been broad-
ened, they are still the subject of controversy. The exceptions do not sat-
isfy privacy advocates who have criticized that while concessions have
been granted to the commercial sector, they have not been extended to
individuals. 32 Further, by treating various products, businesses, and coun-
tries differently, the exceptions lead to inconsistent and arbitrary out-
comes. This becomes apparent when one attempts to create arguments
based upon national security and law enforcement that justify why the
26. Cylink, supra note 12. Triple 56-bit is not three times as strong as single 56-bit
as one might think, but rather 256 times stronger than single 56-bit. Id.
27. Id. But see infra text accompanying notes 174-176 for other statements by Wil-
liam Reinsch that are not as supportive of looser export controls.
28. See, e.g., Administration Relaxes Rules on Encryption, A Bit, 220 N.Y.L.J. S13
(1998) and Encryption Exporters Win, Lose, Electronic Messaging News, July 22, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 7999372.
29. Id. The 45 countries are those that comply with international treaties to combat
money laundering. Id.
30. Id.
31. See White House Statement, supra note 9.
32. See Elizabeth Corcoran, U.S. to Relax Encryption Limits, WASH. POST, Sept. 17,
1998, at C4, available in 1998 WL 16556617; Louise Kehoe, U.S. and Canada: U.S. Re-
laxes Encryption Export Curbs, FIN. TiMEs, Sept. 17, 1998, at 8, available in 1998 WL
12266245.
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businesses that have been granted exceptions have a greater need for pri-
vacy than do such businesses as the defense industry or law firms. Nev-
ertheless, the administration intends to continue addressing, on a "case-
by-case basis," which end users and nations it should next include within
the exception.33 Unfortunately, these decisions may ultimately have less
to do with the foreign policy and security concerns of the United States,
and more to do with how effective the exporter is at lobbying. As Bruce
Schneier, the President of Counterpane Systems, Inc. put it, "[i]f you
have enough money and if you are patient enough, you can get just
about anything exported."' 4
B. What Constitutes An Encryption Export
Now that the current encryption export policies have been set forth,
it is necessary to examine what exactly constitutes an exportation of en-
cryption. The EAR defines an export as "an actual shipment or transmis-
sion of items subject to the EAR out of the United States, or release of
technology or software subject to the EAR to a foreign national in the
United States."'3 5 But the regulations on encryption have an additional
definition for the exportation of encryption source code and object code.
This definition states that for the purposes of the encryption software
regulations the word "exporting" includes the
[D]ownloading, or causing the downloading of, such software to
locations (including electronic bulletin boards, Internet file trans-
fer protocol, and World Wide Web sites) outside the U.S., or
making such software available for transfer outside the United
States, over wire, cable, radio, electromagnetic, photo-optical,
photoelectric or other comparable communications facilities ac-
33. See White House Statement, supra note 9.
34. Jim Kerstetter, Crypto Holes Slow Export Adoption: Arbitrary Rulings Confuse
ISV's, Users, PC WEEK, June 1, 1998, at 8. Lobbying efforts on behalf of encryption ex-
ports have increased dramatically in recent years and a large reason for this has been the
formation and success of the lobbying group Americans for Computer Privacy (ACP).
Andrew Mollison, Coalition Near Compromise on Encryption Laws: By Creating Lobby-
ing Army, Group on Cusp of Deal With Security Agencies to Allow Export of Codes, AT-
LANTA J. & ATLANTA CONST., Aug. 1, 1998, at A8, available in 1998 WL 3707039. The
ACP was formed in 1997 after Congress was unable to pass legislation allowing greater
encryption exports. Id. Since its inception the ACP has grown to include more than 40
associations, 90 companies, and 2000 individuals and as of August 1997 had the authority
to spend between five and eight million dollars. Id. This is in addition to the more than
seven million dollars that its members have contributed in federal campaign contributions
in the course of a year and a half. Id.
35. 15 C.F.R. §734.2(b)(1) (1998).
19981
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cessible to persons outside the United States, including transfers
from electronic bulletin boards, Internet file transfer protocol and
World Wide Web sites.36
Although this definition appears to be very comprehensive when com-
bined with the traditional definition, it is not foolproof. For example, as
stated earlier a printed book containing encryption source code is not
subject to the EAR and therefore can be exported.3 7 Once such a book is
obtained anyone using a scanner or anyone able to type will be able to
input this material into a computer and transform it into object code.
Even though the U.S. government has stated that it has reserved the right
to impose controls on encryption source code in printed form that is
scannable, such exports are currently permitted.3 8 This makes the EAR
distinction between source code in printed form which is exportable and
source code in electronic form which requires a license ineffective be-
cause the license requirement can easily be circumvented.
Not only do the definitions contain loopholes, but they also cover
some actions that arguably should not be considered as constituting an
export. For example, while the mere posting of a program to a file trans-
fer protocol (FTP) or web server located in the United States constitutes
an export according to the definition, the mere posting of such a program
does not by itself result in any sending, taking, disclosure or transmission
of the program to a foreign person.39 Though the definition classifies the
mere posting of encryption as an export, it does include a caveat that
permits encryption products to be placed on Internet sites within the
United States as long as the provider implements safeguards that are
"adequate to prevent unauthorized transfer of such code outside the
United States."' 40 The required precautions include making sure that ac-
cess to and transfer of the software is controlled through such measures
as: (1) checking the address of every system attempting to obtain the
software to make sure that the system is located within the United States;
(2) providing a requesting party with notice that the transfer of the
software is subject to export controls and that it cannot be exported with-
out a license; and (3) requiring every party requesting a transfer to ac-
knowledge that they understand that the software is subject to export
controls. 41
36. 15 C.F.R. §734.2(b)(9)(ii) (1998) (italics added).
37. 15 C.FR. §734.3(b)(2) (1998). See supra text accompanying notes 19-20.
38. See supra note 20.
39. See Rubinstein, supra note 3, at 342.
40. 15 C.F.R. §734.2(b)(9)(ii) (1998).
41. 15 C.F.R. §734.2(b)(9)(ii)(A)(1-3) (1998).
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However, since it is nearly impossible for most Internet users to sat-
isfy these precautions, ultimately almost any posting of software on the
Internet will be an export.4 2 Even if satisfied, these precautions are not
full-proof because they still do not ensure that the regulated encryption
will stay only within the hands of U.S. citizens as the regulations require.
A foreign person who has signed up for Internet access using a U.S. In-
ternet Service Provider (ISP) and who signed into the secure download
site either from within the United States or who payed long distances
charges to dial-in to a U.S. ISP from an overseas location, would be
granted access to the encryption information. 43 Even if a vendor follows
the guidelines, there is no guarantee that the vendor will be shielded
from liability in the event that a controlled item is exported."4
In addition to containing loopholes and being circumvented, the ex-
portation regulations can be confusing and unclear. The export controls
on encryption software were once so broad that many business execu-
tives who traveled overseas with their laptop computers undoubtedly vio-
lated the controls since many standard off-the-shelf office and business
programs were subject to the export regulations.45 The EAR have since
been clarified to permit the temporary export of encryption hardware and
software, but the regulations continue to require that the temporary ex-
porter retain control of the computer throughout the trip, that the com-
puter be for the temporary exporter's exclusive and personal use and that
it not be used for copying, demonstration, marketing, or sale.46 If the
temporary export is not for the exporters personal use, then different,
more stringent regulations apply in addition to those required for per-
sonal use.47 There are also detailed controls on the use of the programs
for demonstrations and exhibitions, 48 the destinations to which the en-
42. See Junger v. Daley, 8 F.Supp.2d 708 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (acknowledging that it
is "nearly impossible for most Internet users to carry out or verify these precautions.")
43. See RUBINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 344.
44. See id. It is more likely that the vendor's web site would be shut down than
that he or she would be prosecuted. Id.
45. See MIDDLEHURST, ET AL., supra note 6, at 554.
46. 15 C.F.R. §740.9(a) (1998).
47. 15 C.F.R. §740.9(a)(2)(iii) (1998).
48. Id. For example, the regulations on exhibitions and demonstrations require that
the exporter: (1) retain ownership of the software or commodity; (2) retain effective con-
trol of the product; (3) not use the product for its intended purpose while abroad, except
to the minimum extent required for effective demonstration; and (4) not demonstrate or
exhibit the product at any one site for more than 120 days. 15 C.FR. §740.9(a)(2)(iii)
(1998). In addition, no commodity or software may be exported if an order to acquire the
product has been received before shipment. 15 C.F.R. §740.9(a)(3)(iii)(A) (1998). What
this means is that once an order to acquire a commodity or software has been received,
the product cannot be exported for exhibition or demonstration purposes even if the dem-
19981
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cryption commodity or software can be exported,49 the length of time that
a product can be exhibited or demonstrated 50 rules on when an exporter
will be authorized to retain the product abroad for more than a year,
51
and restrictions on the permanent export or re-export of products that are
temporarily abroad, 2 all of which can create substantial confusion and
uncertainty among businesses and lawyers alike as to the proper course
of action for any given product.
C. Circumvention Of The Encryption Regulations
One of the things that threatens to undermine the government's abil-
ity to regulate encryption is that it is virtually impossible to guarantee the
success of future controls, because all controls are susceptible to circum-
vention. Not only are there ways for foreigners to circumvent U.S. con-
trols and obtain encryption information,53 but the controls are also being
avoided by U.S. persons and industries. A few U.S. businesses are at-
tempting to do this by setting up subsidiaries in foreign countries to li-
cense encryption products made by foreign companies and sell them to
overseas markets.5 4 This is legal as long as the U.S. parent company does
not provide any technical assistance to the subsidiary and distributes the
products from distributors outside the United States.5 5 Currently several
onstration or exhibition were to occur in a different country from where the order
originated. In other words, once an order to acquire has been received, the product cannot
be exported anywhere without a license.
49. 15 C.FR. §740.9(a)(3)(i) (1998).
50. 15 C.F.R. §740.9(a)(2)(iii) (1998).
51. 15 C.F.R. §740.9(a)(4)(iii) (1998).
52. 15 C.F.R. §740.9(a)(4)(i) (1998).
53. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. In addition to those previously men-
tioned, circumvention also occurs when foreign companies purchase American- produced
56-bit encryption technology and then upgrade it in their own countries to 128-bit tech-
nology. Rep. Adam Smith, Encryption Laws Stymie U.S. Competitiveness, PUGET SOUND
Bus. J., Sep. 19, 1997, at 63 available in 1997 WL 11543883. This was done recently by
a group of Australian software developers who obtained from Netscape the source code
for the web browser Netscape Communicator that has a 40-bit encryption capability and
within 15 hours had built a generic browser that contained 128-bit capabilities. Stan Beer,
Secure Code Slips US Net, Ausm. FIN. REv., Apr. 7, 1998, at 41, available in 1998 WL
9425566.
54. See infra note 56.
55. Greg Miller, Network Associates Crafts Overseas Deal to Sell Encryption
Trade: Its Subsidiary Would License Product from Swiss Firm to Avoid Restrictions, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1998, at D1, available in 1998 WL 2409888. As stated earlier the U.S.
export restrictions only forbid the shipment of actual software while permitting the publi-
cation of written source code. Id. See also supra text accompanying note 19-20.
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companies plan to create such arrangements. 56
The U.S. regulatory agencies have expressed concern over this de-
veloping situation which stems from the fact that the businesses are fol-
lowing "the letter, if not the spirit" of the law.57 In an attempt to curtail
this development, the Commerce Department closely scrutinized those
companies which announced plans to create such arrangements and has
threatened investigations. 58 Although as of yet the Commerce Department
has not taken any action against such companies, the close scrutiny has
probably prevented this circumvention technique from becoming wide-
spread.59 But if the arrangements that are currently being set up by U.S.
companies are able to avoid penalties from the Commerce Department,
then undoubtedly the number of such arrangements will increase quickly.
This would force the U.S. government into a precarious situation because
there is very little that it would be able to do against the foreign subsidi-
aries selling the products and even less that it would be able to do
against the foreign corporations that are creating the encryption.
III. RELEVANT CASE LAW
Circumvention, confusion, and arbitrariness are not the only
problems surrounding the regulation of encryption exports. Three princi-
pal cases exist involving challenges to the government's encryption ex-
port regulations. 60 In Karn v. United States Department of State,61 the
56. Sun Microsystems planned to market Russian-made encryption software to for-
eign customers from distributors outside the United States. Don Clark, Sun Is Holding Off
on Plans to Market Russian-Made Encryption Software, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 1998, at B8,
available in 1998 WL 3485421. However, Sun Microsystems has not yet marketed the
product because it is a major computer supplier to the U.S. government and felt an obli-
gation to be a "good citizen" and therefore decided to respect the Commerce Depart-
ment's concerns. Id. Network Associates, Inc. is another example of circumvention by a
U.S. business. A Swiss company has developed a product that uses source code published
by Network Associates. Miller, supra note 55, at DI. A European subsidiary of Network
Associates has licensed the product and is planning to sell it in overseas markets. Id. En-
trust is a final example of this type of circumvention. Entrust is a Canadian company that
has an American parent company named Nortel. Entrust sells a 128-bit encryption pro-
gram for less than $50. Smith, supra note 53, at 63.
57. Miller, supra note 55. William Reinsch, Under Secretary of Commerce, has ac-
knowledged that if Network Associates only provides published source code, the com-
pany would not be in technical violation of the regulations. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. However, the dispute that has been most widely covered which involved Phillip
Zimmerman and his encryption program Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), did not spawn legal
proceedings. See MIDDLEHURST, ET AL., supra note 6, at 554. Although the government
did investigate Zimmerman for export violations, he was never prosecuted and the
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U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held that even if source
code constituted speech for First Amendment purposes, Karn's free
speech rights were not violated because U.S. foreign policy and national
security concerns provided sufficient reasons to uphold the regulations.6 2
Junger v. Daley63 is another case that has upheld the government regula-
tions. In Junger, a U.S. District Court in Ohio ruled that the regulations
are constitutional because encryption source code is inherently functional,
the regulations are not directed at the expressive elements of source code,
and the regulations do not reach academic discussions of software or
software in print form.64 There has not however, been a universal consen-
sus among the courts as to the constitutionality of the current regulations.
There has in fact been one case that has held that the current encryption
export regulations are unconstitutional. In Bernstein v. United States De-
partment of State,65 a U.S. District Court in California concluded that the
encryption regulations are an unconstitutional prior restraint on expres-
sion that is protected by the First Amendment. 66
How these contradicting interpretations of the First Amendment are
ultimately resolved by the appellate courts will affect the encryption reg-
ulations and influence the form and scope of future regulations. If the
reasoning in Karn and Junger is upheld, then the current regulations
could continue indefinitely and any similar future regulations would be
likely to withstand First Amendment challenges. But if the reasoning
used in the Bernstein case eventually prevails, then the current regula-
tions as well as any future regulations will have to be drafted more con-
scientiously to avoid potential First Amendment pitfalls that would un-
dermine their validity. It is therefore necessary to evaluate all three of the
cases and understand the reasoning behind them in order to determine
how their eventual resolution might affect future government regulations.
A. The Bernstein Case
Daniel Bernstein, while a graduate student at the University of Cali-
fornia at Berkeley, developed an encryption algorithm called "Snuffle. ' 6 7
Bernstein expressed his algorithm as an academic paper entitled "The
Snuffle Encryption System" and also as source code that was written in
charges were eventually dropped. Id.
61. 925 F.Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1996).
62. Karn, 925 F.Supp. at 1, 9.
63. No. 1:96-CV-1723, 1998 WL 388972 (N.D. Ohio).
64. Junger, 1998 WL 388972, at *1.
65. 974 F.Supp. 1288 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
66. Bernstein, 974 F.Supp. at 1308.
67. Id. at 1293.
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"C." 68 Bernstein then submitted a commodity jurisdiction request to the
Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC) to determine whether the pa-
per and the source code were controlled by the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations (ITAR).69 In response, the ODTC, after consultations
with the Departments of Commerce and Defense, determined that Snuffle
was a defense article and was subject to licensing requirements prior to
export.70 Bernstein subsequently submitted a second request in July of
1993 to determine whether the academic paper had been included as part
of the prior ODTC decision.71 The ODTC informed Bernstein that the pa-
per was indeed a defense article and that it required a license. 72 However,
after Bernstein initiated legal proceedings the ODTC clarified in a letter
that the paper was actually not a defense article. 73 Nevertheless, the
ODTC still maintained that the electronic versions of Snuffle, as well as
the explanations and descriptions of how to use and program Snuffle
onto a computer, were defense articles subject to ODTC control. 74 The
ODTC's position led Bernstein to bring an action that challenged the
classification of the electronic version of Snuffle as a defense article.75
Bernstein claimed that the laws upon which the classification were based,
the Arms Export Control Act (AECA)7 6 and the ITAR, were both uncon-
stitutional on their face and as they applied to him, because they violated
the First Amendment by preventing him from teaching, publishing or dis-
68. Id. Bernstein's program in "C" language detailed both the encryption and the
decryption procedures of Snuffle. Id. "C" is a high-level computer programming lan-
guage. Id. (footnote omitted). Once source code such as "C" is converted into object
code by a computer, it is possible for the computer to encrypt and decrypt data. Id. Ob-
ject code is a binary system that consists of a series of O's and 1's. Id.
69. 22 C.F.R. §§120-30 (1994). Bernstein v. United Stated Dep't of State, 922
F.Supp. 1426, 1430 (N.D. Cal. 1996). Before Executive Order 13026 was issued on No-
vember 15, 1996 the ODTC, rather than the EAA, had jurisdiction over the exportation of
encryption. Bernstein, 974 F.Supp. at 1293. See infra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
70. Bernstein, 922 F.Supp. at 1430.
71. Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 945 F.Supp. 1279, 1284 (N.D. Cal.
1996). It is probable that Bernstein submitted a second request because the ODTC had
identified Snuffle within the first request as a "stand-alone cryptographic algorithm which
is not incorporated into a finished software product." Id. The ODTC had also informed
Bernstein that "a commercial software product which incorporated Snuffle might not be
subject to State Department control and should be submitted as a new request." Id.
72. Id. at 1285.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 974 F.Supp. 1288, 1293 (N.D. Cal.
1997).
76. 22 U.S.C.A. §2778 (1994).
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cussing with other scientists his theories on cryptography."
In the first action between Bernstein and the United States Depart-
ment of State (Bernstein J),8 the District Court held that the "C" source
code was speech for purposes of the First Amendment and that Bern-
stein's claims were therefore justiciable.79 One argument propounded by
the government was that the encrypting of electronic communications
served a functional purpose rather than a communicative one. 80 There-
fore, according to the government, the program was not speech but rather
conduct which should only be protected if it is "sufficiently imbued with
the elements of communication." 81 Judge Patel rejected this argument,
concluding that "the functionality of a language does not make it any
less like speech" and that the communicative nature of conduct need be
inquired into only after determining that the act at issue is indeed con-
duct rather than speech.82
In the second action between these two parties (Bernstein i/),83 the
same court concluded that the licensing requirements applicable to en-
cryption software under the ITAR constituted an unlawful prior restraint
to the First Amendment. 84 However, before the court issued its order,
President Clinton issued Executive Order 13026, which transferred juris-
diction over the export of nonmilitary encryption products to the Depart-
ment of Commerce pursuant to the Export Administration Act of 197985
77. Bernstein, 974 F.Supp. at 1293.
78. 945 F.Supp. 1279 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
79. Bernstein, 974 F.Supp. at 1293. The court stated that it could find "no mean-
ingful difference between computer language, particularly high-level languages as defined
above, and German or French." Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 922 F.Supp
1426, 1435 (N.D. Cal. 1996). But see John P. Collins, Jr., Note, Speaking in Code, 106
YALE L.J. 2691 (1997) (concluding that cryptographic computer source code is conduct
not entitled to protection by the First Amendment and that the court in Bernstein was in-
correct in categorizing it as speech). See also Thinh Nguyen, Note, Cryptography, Export
Controls, and the First Amendment in Bernstein v. United States Department of State, 10
HARv. J.L. & TECH. 667 (1997), for an analysis of the decision to include source code as
speech that is protected by the First Amendment.
80. Bernstein, 922 F.Supp. at 1435.
81. Id. at 1434 (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989)). See also
Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409 (1974) (per curiam).
82. Bernstein, 922 FSupp. at 1435. The Bernstein court believed that Johnson and
Spence imply that a court need only assess the expressiveness of conduct in the absence
of "the spoken or written word"' which meant that it was not applicable in the instant
case because the encryption system was written. Id. at 1434-35 (citing Johnson, 491 U.S.
at 404).
83. 922 F.Supp. 1426 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
84. Bernstein, 974 F.Supp. at 1293. In this decision the court also looked at
"vagueness and over breadth challenges to certain terms contained in the ITAR." Id.
85. Export Administration Act of 1979, 50 App. U.S.C.A. §§2401-2420 (1998).
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(EAA) and the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) while encryp-
tion for military purposes would continue to be regulated by the ITAR.16
Using its newfound authority, the Commerce Department issued new
rules regulating the export of certain encryption products 8 7 These new
regulations permitted some additional exceptions for certain commercial
encryption items, including exportation of software without key recovery
of up to 56-bit key length as long as the manufacturer made a commit-
ment to develop a key recovery system."8
Bernstein subsequently amended his complaint to include the new
regulations and new defendants.89 The issue before the court in the latest
action was whether the amendments to the EAR mandating licensing re-
quirements for the export of cryptographic devices, software and related
technology, constituted a prior restraint on speech in violation of the First
Amendment. 90 Because the regulations that control the exportation of en-
cryption are no longer currently under the ITAR, the court first had to
determine whether the transfer of jurisdiction to the Commerce Depart-
ment was valid.91 Once satisfied that the transfer was valid, the court
turned its attention to deciding whether the Commerce Department had
created regulations that constituted a prior restraint to free speech while
failing to provide the necessary safeguards.92
86. Bernstein, 974 F.Supp. at 1293.
87. Encryption Regulations, 61 Fed. Reg. 68,572 (1996) (codified at 15 C.F.R. Pts.
730-774).
88. See, e.g., Richard R. Mainland, Congress Holds the Key to Encryption Regula-
tion, 20 NAT'L L.J. 34, B9 (1998). Remember that this has again changed so that encryp-
tion with key lengths of 56-bits or less can now be exported without key recovery. See
supra text accompanying notes 12-16,
89. Bernstein, 974 F.Supp. at 1292. The new defendants included the Department of
Energy, the Department of Justice, and the Central Intelligence Agency. Id. at 1309.
90. Id. at 1292.
91. Id. at 1297. The court states that the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act (IEEPA) is broad enough to encompass encryption and that therefore the President
can regulate encryption under the IEEPA because encryption does not come within one of
the exceptions to the IEEPA. Id. at 1297. The court did not review whether the President
exceeded his authority when he transferred jurisdiction, because he acted under the au-
thorization of Congress thus giving the transfer the strongest presumption of validity. Id.
at 1297, 1300. The court also decided that the Department of Commerce had the proper
authority to regulate encryption under the IEEPA. Id. at 1300. Finally, the court found
that encryption does come within the meaning of the regulation, that communications
dealing with encryption have value and that encryption products do not fall within the ex-
emption for informational materials provided by the statute. Id. at 1301-02. Therefore, ac-
cording to the court although the government has "the authority to regulate encryption
source code, they must nonetheless do so within the bounds of the First Amendment." Id.
at 1303.
92. Id. at 1300.
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As the Supreme Court has stated and as the court in Bernstein
pointed out, "it has been generally, if not universally, considered that it
is the chief purpose of the [First Amendment] guaranty to prevent previ-
ous restraints upon publication." 93 Thus, any prior restraint on the First
Amendment has a "heavy presumption" against its constitutional valid-
ity.94 Nevertheless, the government can impose valid time, place and
manner restrictions when they are content neutral, narrowly tailored to
serve a substantial interest, and leave open alternative channels for com-
munication.95 However, such valid content neutral restrictions on expres-
sion may not be conditioned upon obtaining a license from a government
official when that official has "boundless discretion. '"96 In addition, the
Bernstein court stated that an item does not have to be regulated for its
content in order for the regulations to function as a prior restraint since
the regulation of expressive activity is also sufficient to create a prior re-
straint under the Supreme Court plurality opinion of FWIPBS, Inc. v. City
of Dallas.97
Consequently, because the Bernstein court had already determined in
its previous decisions that source code constituted expressive activity, the
court used the Freedman test to examine whether the Commerce Depart-
ment had established procedural safeguards that would validate the prior
restraint created by the licensing scheme. 98 The Freedman test states that
for a licensing scheme to be constitutional, "1) the licensor must make
the licensing decision within a specific and reasonable period of time; 2)
there must be prompt judicial review; and 3) the censor must bear the
burden of going to court to uphold a licensing denial and once there
bears the burden of justifying the denial." 99
The court in Bernstein found that the current EAR procedures lack
any standards for deciding an application and impose no limits on agency
discretion, stating that the constraints were "illusory" and that it allows
93. Id. at 1303 (citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931)).
94. Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971) (citations
omitted).
95. Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
96. Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 764 (1988).
97. Bernstein, 974 F.Supp. at 1307 (citing FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493
U.S. 215, 223 (1990) (plurality opinion)). In FW/PBS, the plurality opinion stated that
"[B]ecause we conclude that the city's licensing scheme lacks adequate procedural safe-
guards, we do not reach the issue decided by the Court of Appeals whether the ordinance
is properly viewed as a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction aimed at sec-
ondary effects arising out of the sexually orientated businesses." FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at
223 (plurality opinion).
98. Bernstein, 974 F.Supp. at 1307-08.
99. FW/PBS, 493 U.S. at 227-28 (plurality opinion).
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the BXA to deny an application by claiming that it is "contrary to na-
tional security and foreign policy interests" without having to provide
any additional reasons.1°° Therefore, the court concluded that the licens-
ing scheme was "woefully inadequate" and an unconstitutional prior re-
straint in violation of the First Amendment without providing the neces-
sary safeguards.10'
The court also analyzed whether the government's national security
and foreign policy rationales justified the prior restraints. The court used
language from New York Times Co. v. United States,02 that stated that
national security and foreign policy by themselves are not sufficient to
justify a prior restraint such as a licensing scheme. 10 3 Therefore, the
Bernstein court found that because national security and foreign policy
reasons were the only justifications provided by the government, regula-
tions that constitute a prior restraint cannot be upheld on those
grounds,1°4 particularly when, according to the court, "none of the en-
cryption items subject to export controls under the EAR have military
applications." 105
B. The Karn Case
In 1994 Phil Karn, a computer engineer, submitted a commodity ju-
risdiction request to the Department of State for a book containing en-
cryption algorithms. 10 6 In response to this request, the Department of
State's Office of Defense Trade Controls (ODTC) determined that the
100. Bernstein, 974 F.Supp. at 1308. The court was also concerned with the fact
that although license applications must be resolved or referred to the President within 90
days, there is no time limit on an application that has been referred to the President. Id.
In addition, if a license is denied, there is not a definite time limit on the appeals deci-
sion and that decision is not subject to judicial review. Id.
101. Id. In addition, even though the court had already determined from the prior
proceedings that the encryption material was speech, the court pointed out that the dis-
tinction between print and electronic media was untenable and that the Internet was sub-
ject to the same exacting level of First Amendment scrutiny as print media. Id. at 1306-
07.
102. 403 U.S. 714 (1971).
103. Bernstein, 974 F.Supp. at 1307. The court also stated that although prior re-
straints could be overridden in times of war, even then they would be limited to when
disclosure would "surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Na-
tion or its people." Id. at 1307, quoting New York limes Co., 403 U.S. at 730.
104. Bernstein, 974 F.Supp. at 1307.
105. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 85-86.
106. Karn v. United States Dep't of State, 925 F.Supp. 1, 3 (D.D.C. 1996). The
book contained source code for several powerful encryption algorithms that were written
in the "C" programming language. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 338. See discussion
supra note 68.
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book was not subject to the jurisdiction of the International Traffic in
Arms Regulations (ITAR) since the item was in the "public domain."' 107
The ODTC explained that the ruling only covered the book and not the
source code disks available from the author even though they both con-
tained the same materials, because the diskette was designated as a "de-
fense article" under the United States Munitions List and therefore sub-
ject to additional regulations. 10 8 The ODTC justified this position by
stating that the text files on the disk were not identical to the source
code printed in the book, since "[e]ach source code listing has been par-
titioned into its own file and has the capability of being easily compiled
into an executable subroutine."' 1 9
Unhappy with this result, Kam filed a federal lawsuit that raised
First and Fifth Amendment claims and also alleged that the commodity
jurisdiction denial was an abuse of administrative discretion under the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA)." 0 The APA claim was dismissed
by Judge Richey as non justiciable."' Richey stressed that this case was
a "political question" for the two elected branches and that it presented
a "classic example" of how courts can be needlessly invoked in litiga-
tion over foreign policy issues because the plaintiff has not been able to
persuade the elected branches that the technology at issue does not en-
danger national security. 1 2 Richey went on to find that the commodity
jurisdiction procedure used for the Arms Export Control Act (AECA)
and the ITAR as well as the designation of the diskette as a "defense ar-
ticle" were not subject to judicial review. 3
107. RuBINsTEN, supra note 3, at 338. Although the decision in Karn was based
upon the AODTC" and the ITAR rather than the EAA and the EAR, it is still useful as a
forecaster of how this court will approach the First Amendment issue in future cases.
108. Karn, 925 FSupp. at 4.
109. RumNsTEiN, supra note 3, at 338.
110. Karn, 925 F.Supp. at 3.
111. Id. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit remanded the case to the District Court to determine "the reviewability of and, if
appropriate, the merits of appellant's claim under the Administrative Procedure Act."
Karn v. United States Dep't of State, 107 F.3d. 923, 1 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The remand was
the result of the transfer of regulatory authority to the Commerce Department and the
new regulations which were subsequently promulgated. Id. The Court of Appeals stated
that courts should always first consider alternative grounds for resolution whenever they
are asked to answer a question involving the Constitution. Id. Regardless of the remand,
the Karn case is still useful as a guide as to how courts in future cases may decide to
resolve the First Amendment issue, especially since the court in Bernstein determined that
the APA does not create any justiciable claims. Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State,
974 F.Supp. 1288, 1298 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
112. Id.
113. Karn, 925 F.Supp. at 5-6. Richey interpreted Section 2778(h) of the AECA as
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Karn also did not prevail on his constitutional claims. The court
stated that even though constitutional challenges would normally be al-
lowable for the disputed regulations, they were not justified here because
there were no material facts in dispute regarding the First Amendment
since the regulation was content neutral and satisfied an intermediate
level of scrutiny as established by the O'Brien test. 114 The O'Brien test
states that content neutral regulations may be justified if the regulation is
(1) within the constitutional power of the government, (2) "furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest," and (3) is narrowly tai-
lored to the governmental interest. 15 According to the court, the three re-
quirements of the O'Brien test were all satisfied in Karn, the first two
being undisputed by the plaintiff, and the third because the plaintiff did
not present a satisfactory argument as to why the regulation was not nar-
rowly tailored. 116 The court wrote that the President's decision to restrict
the export of encryption software by placing it on the ITAR was a for-
eign policy decision that could not be scrutinized, even though the en-
cryption was already available overseas which would seem to prevent the
current regulations from furthering U.S. national security.'17 Also of sig-
nificance are the court's statements that the plaintiff did not have stand-
ing to argue the claim that certain provisions of the ITAR constituted an
unconstitutional prior restraint, since the provisions had not yet been ap-
plied to the plaintiff." 8 The Karn court was therefore able to avoid the
precluding judicial review over not only the act of listing items on the munitions list
which is what the plaintiff desired, but also as precluding the determination of whether
things such as the diskette was actually covered by an item on the munitions list. Id. Al-
though the court conceded that normally judicial review is allowed absent clear and con-
vincing evidence of legislative intent to preclude it, the court concluded that in the cur-
rent situation that the legislature had intended for judicial review to be precluded. Id. at
6.
114. Id. at 9-11. The regulation is content neutral according to the court, because
the government is not regulating the "expressive content of the comments and or source
code, but instead [is] regulating because of the belief that the combination of encryption
source code on machine readable media will make it easier for foreign intelligence
sources to encode their communications." Id. at 10. The court in Karn also concluded
that it was unnecessary to determine the nature of the materials contained on the diskette,
because the government rationale behind the regulation was the controlling factor and that
the form of the speech or expression regulated was not important. Id. Nor did it matter to
the court that the book form of the encryption was treated differently than the diskette
form. Id.
115. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 388 (1968).
116. Karn, 925 F.Supp. at 10-11.
117. Id. at 11. The court recognized that the plaintiff's argument as to the third re-
quirement actually concerned the second requirement and dealt with it accordingly. Id.
118. Id. at 12.
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prior restraint argument that was used by the Bernstein court to find in
favor of the plaintiff.
C. The Junger Case
Peter Junger is a law professor who maintains sites on the World
Wide Web that contain information about the courses that he teaches, in-
cluding a course on computers and the law.119 Junger wanted to post to
his web site various encryption programs that he had written to show
how computers work.12 0 However, as discussed earlier such postings are
a violation of the export regulations.2 1 Junger therefore submitted appli-
cations to the Commerce Department requesting a determination of the
commodity classifications for the encryption software programs.2 2 The
Commerce Department informed Junger that the software was covered by
the regulations and required an export license.123
Junger filed suit claiming that the licensing requirements for the ex-
portation of encryption software constitute a prior restraint that violate
the First Amendment's free speech clause. 24 Although the court con-
ceded that encryption source code may occasionally be expressive, it
found that its export was still not protected conduct under the First
Amendment. 25 The court came to this conclusion by determining that en-
cryption software is functional rather than expressive and that it is rarely
used to communicate ideas.126 As such, encryption source code according
to the court is exported to transfer functions, not to communicate ideas
119. Junger, 8 F.Supp.2d at 713-14 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
120. Id.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 39-44.
122. See Junger, 8 F.Supp.2d at 714.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 711. Junger also had four other counts within his complaint that the
court ruled upon. Id. At 711-12. In Count Two the court found that the regulations were
not over broad because they do not injure third parties in a different manner from the
way they affected Junger and that the regulations are not vague. Id. With regard to Count
Three, the court found that even though the regulations subject encryption to more strin-
gent restrictions than other items, that the regulations are content neutral and able to pass
an intermediate level of scrutiny because they allow the government to collect vital for-
eign intelligence, are not directed at a source code's idea, and do not burden more speech
than is necessary. Id. See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text for the intermediate
level of scrutiny as established by O'Brien. The court found that Count Four had been
waived by Junger. Id. As for Count Five, the court found that it did not have the jurisdic-
tion to review whether the President exceeded his authority under the IEEPA when he di-
rected that encryption products be controlled for export. Id.
125. Id. at 712. See supra note 80-82 and accompanying text to compare how this
functionality argument was treated by the Bernstein court.
126. Id. at 715-18.
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and that the value to the importer stems from the function that the source
code performs. 27 Because the court acknowledged that the exportation of
source code could occasionally be expressive, it went through the guide-
lines provided by the Supreme Court that establish when occasionally ex-
pressive conduct is "sufficiently imbued with the elements of communi-
cation to fall within the scope of the First . . . Amendment."'' 28 As
stated by the Supreme Court, to be protected by the First Amendment
"an intent to convey a particularized message [must be] present, and in
the surrounding circumstances the likelihood [must be] great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it.' 1 29 The Junger
court in applying this standard stated that encryption source code did not
convey "an unmistakable message" and that the communicative nature
of source code is not "overwhelmingly apparent" and therefore found
that the export of source code software was not protected conduct under
the First Amendment. 130
Similarly the court found that "the prior restraint doctrine is not im-
plicated simply because an activity may on occasion be expressive."'' 31
The court justified its decision by comparing encryption to a case from
the Ninth Circuit which held that an anti-sitting ordinance that impaired
the expressive acts of sitting or lying on the sidewalk was not an uncon-
stitutional prior restraint because such actions are not "integral to, or
commonly associated with, expression."'' 32 The court also stated that for
a licensing law to be invalidated by a prior restraint challenge, it "must
have a close enough nexus to expression, or to conduct commonly asso-
ciated with expression, to pose a real and substantial threat" of censor-
ship.133 The court concluded that encryption source code was not "inte-
gral" to expression and has little expressive nature because source code
is normally only a set of instructions to a computer that is used to con-
trol its operation. 34 After coming to these conclusions, the court granted
127. Id.
128. Junger, 8 F.Supp.2d at 717 (citing Spence v. State of Washington, 418 U.S.
405, 409-10 (1974) (per curiam)). This is the same test that the Bernstein court analyzed.
See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text.
129. Id. (citing Spence, 418 U.S. at 411).
130. Id. (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989) and Tinker v. Des
Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505-06 (1969)).
131. Id. at 717-18.
132. ld. at 718 (citing Roulette v. City of Seattle, 97 F.3d 300, 304 (9th Cir.1996)).
133. Id. at 718 (citing City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ'g Co., 486 U.S. 750,
759 (1988)).
134. Junger, 8 FSupp.2d at 718.
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summary judgment for the U.S. government on the First Amendment ar-
guments set forth by Junger. 35
D. Comparing Bernstein, Karn, and Junger
The most interesting aspect of the three cases is that they were de-
cided so differently even though they arose from similar facts. Despite
their contradictory outcomes, the cases do agree in some areas. They all
agree that books, academic writings, and papers can be exported without
a government license, because they are "protected speech" under the
First Amendment. 13 6 The Karn and Bernstein courts, the two courts that
examined the issue, also agreed that although the AECA and the EAA/
EAR bar judicial review of the designation of encryption items as de-
fense items, they do not bar constitutional claims regarding the regula-
tions themselves. 137
But while the courts agreed on these points, they disagreed on sev-
eral other issues. Although the electronic forms of the encryption were
the source of controversy in both cases, Bernstein stressed the glaring in-
consistency of allowing some forms of export but not others'38 while
Karn determined that this was a valid distinction. 39 More importantly,
the courts disagreed over whether the government regulations constituted
valid restrictions upon the plaintiffs' First Amendment rights and whether
the exports of encryption were expressive or functional. 140 The Karn
court found that the ITAR regulations were content neutral and justifiable
restrictions under the O'Brien test and that it did not have to decide
whether the regulations constituted a prior restraint on the First Amend-
ment. 41 Likewise, the Junger court found that encryption exports were
only occasionally expressive and therefore not protected by the First
Amendment and also that the regulations themselves were content neutral
and satisfied the O'Brien test.142 The Bernstein court however, decided
that even if the regulations were content neutral, the encryption system
was pure speech that could not be limited by a prior restraint without es-
tablishing sufficient safeguards.' 43
135. Id. at 711.
136. See, e.g., RUBINSTEN, supra note 3, at 340.
137. Id.
138. Bernstein v. United States Dep't of State, 974 F.Supp. 1288, 1306 (N.D. Cal.
1997).
139. Karn, 925 F. Supp. at 10.
140. See, e.g., RuBrNSTmN, supra note 3, at 339.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 114-118.
142. See supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85 and 98-100.
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Although the reasoning used by the court in the Karn case is per-
suasive on many points, the court side-stepped both a decision as to
whether the regulations actually further the government's national secur-
ity interest and a prior restraint analysis, the latter being an issue that
later proved to be decisive in the Bernstein cases. The Junger court also
concluded that the prior restraint doctrine was not at issue, because the
exportation of encryption software was inherently functional and only oc-
casionally expressive. 144 In coming to its conclusion the court in Junger
while acknowledging the argument that a court need only assess the ex-
pressiveness of conduct in the absence of "the spoken or written word,"
emphasized that "what determines whether the First Amendment protects
something is whether it expresses ideas." 145 The court went on to detail
how "fighting words" are excluded from First Amendment protection
and how commercial advertisements are held to a lesser level of protec-
tion, but then failed to explain why these arguments were applicable to
encryption, choosing instead to focus on encryption's functionality. 146
Moreover, the court does not mention all of the ways that encryp-
tion can be expressive. In other words, by focusing on the fact that en-
cryption source code is often exported to transfer encryption functions,
the court overlooks the fact that source code is often the "natural" and
"best" means of communication for some types of ideas such as mathe-
matical algorithms. 147 The court also overlooks the possibility that this
transfer of functions is itself expressive. The transfer expresses the idea
that people should have the right to converse in private and be able to
exclude other people from their private conversations. A licensing law
that prevents the transfer may therefore constitute a real and substantial
threat of censorship because the law may result in those conversations
not taking place. Given this line of reasoning, in addition to those out-
lined by the cases themselves, it is the prior restraint doctrine as applied
in Bernstein, rather than in Junger, which is the more convincing and the
one that should be applied by the appellate courts. However, given the
wide range of beliefs concerning this issue, this conclusion is far from
certain.
Not only do the three decisions have conflicting results as to the
constitutionality of the current regulations, they also leave unresolved
many of the inconsistencies surrounding the regulations. For example,
144. See supra text accompanying note 131.
145. Junger, 8 F.Supp.2d at 716 (N.D. Ohio 1998) (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 404 (1989)).
146. Id. at 717.
147. Amicus Brief at 11, Bernstein v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 974 F.Supp. 1288
(9th Cir. 1997) (No. 97-16686).
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most (if not all) of the encryption source code at issue in the cases is al-
ready available on the Internet from non-U.S. sites. 148 This makes any
regulation prohibiting the exportation of encryption ineffective, because
the goal of the current regulations is not to inhibit domestic use of en-
cryption, but rather to prevent the exportation of encryption to foreign-
ers.149 The fact that much of the encryption can be obtained from non-
U.S. sites is also important because many of the bills currently in Con-
gress would under such circumstances allow for the encryption to be ex-
ported. 150 Another unresolved issue arises from the fact that most com-
mercial encryption products are sold in object code form and not in
source code.' 15 The Bernstein decision however, only held that "high
level" computer languages constituted speech, but did not decide whether
"low level" languages such as object code also constituted speech.'52 All
of these issues should be addressed by future regulations if they are to be
successful.
Furthermore, the Bernstein decision is also not quite the victory that
many encryption advocates believe it to be since the decision only affects
the current regulations. The current regulations could be modified or new
regulations put in place that could restrict the exportation of encryption
and yet still satisfy the Freedman test. In other words, the Bernstein deci-
sion was based upon "curable defects" of the current regulations.1 53 The
Commerce Department could for example, create standards which require
a reasonable and specific time limit upon which the licensor must make a
decision and that would provide for prompt judicial review. Therefore, if
the administration and the Commerce Department decide to maintain the
current level of restrictions, but provide the necessary standards for deci-
sion making and review, exporters and privacy advocates are not likely
to be as satisfied with the Bernstein decision as they were initially.
Presently, Bernstein, Karn, and Junger only add uncertainty to regu-
lations that were already complex and confusing to those companies who
desire to export products containing encryption. Few concrete answers
are provided to companies who would prefer to have definitive rulings
upon which to base their business decisions and further litigation is
148. RUBNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 340.
149. See supra text accompanying note 5.
150. Sharon Machlis, House Committee Kills Crypto Controls Amendment, COM-
PUTERWORLD, Sept. 29, 1997, at 16.
151. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 3, at 340.
152. Id. There are those that believe that the analogy between machine-readable
code and foreign languages is not very compelling. Id. See also note 79 supra and the ar-
ticle by Thinh Nguyen to which it refers.
153. Mainland, supra note 88.
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therefore likely. Although appellate court review of the contrasting ap-
proaches of the three cases may eventually result in the clarification of
many of these issues, in the meantime they only add to the confusion
which has already resulted in a "regulatory nightmare" for both export-
ers and regulators.1 4 In an attempt to resolve this situation there has been
an effort by both the executive and legislative branches to create new
laws that will more effectively regulate the use and exportation of en-
cryption products. However, given all of the obstacles, it has proven a
difficult task to obtain a consensus about what the future regulations
should encompass.
IV. DIFFERING OPINIONS OVER ENCRYPTION AND RECENT
APPROACHES
The computer industry, financial institutions, and intellectual prop-
erty owners are at odds with various parts of the government as to how
encryption should be controlled as well as to the degree that it should be
controlled. On one side of the debate is an unusual alliance of business
interests and civil liberty groups, with bipartisan support in Congress,
who argue that all encryption export controls should be lifted. 155 This al-
liance claims that strict controls on encryption software violate the First
Amendment and harm U.S. economic interests by allowing companies
from other countries to dominate the market for encryption products. 56 In
addition, this side of the debate argues that current controls on encryption
fail to protect national security interests because equivalent programs are
readily available abroad while simultaneously putting financial systems
and valuable intellectual property at risk.' 7 On the other side of the de-
bate are the groups that would prefer to bar all powerful forms of en-
cryption technology except for those to which the government is allowed
access.'58 These groups argue that this degree of control is necessary to
prevent those uses of encryption which assist criminals in endeavors like
money laundering and terrorism. 159
Between the two extremes of complete deregulation and the banning
154. See Laura M. Pilkington, Comment, First and Fifth Amendment Challenges to
Export Controls on Encryption: Bernstein and Karn, 37 SANTA CLARA L.REv. 159, 204
(1996).
155. Nicholas W. Allard & David A. Kass, Law and Order in Cyberspace: Wash-
ington Report, 19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.L.J. 563, 574 (1997).
156. See MIDDLEHURST, ET AL., supra note 6, at 555.
157. See RuBiNsTEIN, supra note 3, at 346. But see Stender, supra note 4 (article
discussing the importance of national security in the encryption debate).
158. Allard & Kass, supra note 155, at 574.
159. Id. at 573.
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of strong encryption is a middle path. 16° Either the EAA might be re-
newed giving the administration new statutory authority for its EAR
amendments or entirely new legislation might be passed that is specifi-
cally tailored to deal with the exportation of cryptographic products. 161
The latter seems to be the preferred choice at the present time as evi-
denced by the number of bills and amendments that are currently wind-
ing their way through Congress and would have the added benefit of re-
moving the uncertainty that has arisen from the current litigation as to
how the court system will resolve the constitutional issues. In addition, it
would be prudent for Congress and the administration to provide proce-
dures that are more likely to satisfy First Amendment challenges within
any future regulations that they pass.
A. The Clinton Administration's Proposals
For its part, the Clinton administration has put forth a series of pro-
posals that attempt to bridge the two extremes between complete deregu-
lation and banning. One result of these efforts was Clipper IV, which
was formalized in November of 1996.162 It featured the aforementioned
transfer of jurisdiction over encryption export licensing from the State
Department to the Commerce Department. 163 Clipper IV also originally
permitted the exportation of 56-bit encryption products for two years,
provided that the computer industry committed itself to building and
marketing future products that supported key recovery systems.164 The in-
dustry was also required after two years to have key escrow capabilities
installed within all exportable products of greater strength than 40-bits.165
Finally, Clipper IV encouraged the adoption of key escrow systems
through international agreements, standard processes and a new key man-
agement infrastructure. 166
Many in private industry were unhappy with the regulations that
were implemented by the Commerce Department subsequent to the trans-
fer of jurisdiction. They were disturbed with the government mandate
that products include a key escrow system and were worried that a key
160. Id.
161. See, e.g., Pilkington, supra note 154, at 204.
162. See, e.g., Richard L. Field, 1996: Survey of the Year's Developments in Elec-
tronic Cash Law and the Laws Affecting Electronic Banking in the United States, 46
AM.U.LREv. 967, 994 (1997).
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escrow system would be too complex for consumers. 167 Another criticism
is that companies would be "required to submit business and marketing
plans as conditions for export."' 168 Although, some of these complaints
were addressed by the administration's decision to loosen the regulations
in September, 1998, many criticisms still exist. 169
The biggest complaint still expressed by private industry over the
regulations is that the controls will create a significant competitive disad-
vantage for U.S. companies and may force the U.S. computer industry to
lose an important market to foreign rivals. 170 The Economic Strategy In-
stitute (ESI) has estimated that if current U.S. encryption policies are not
reformed, the potential lost revenues for the U.S. information industry
could reach $35-$95 billion over the next five years.' 7 ' The ESI study
also found that 1,601 encryption products were available from 941 firms
in 30 countries as of September 1997.172 Of these, 653 products were
manufactured outside of the United States by 472 foreign firms.
173
However, the view that encryption regulations will harm the U.S.
computer industry is not universally accepted. Commerce Under Secre-
tary William Reinsch, has written that "export controls will help main-
tain U.S. market share of future encryption."1 74 Reinsch wrote that volun-
tary registration of certificate authorities and key-recovery agents will
lend credibility to encryption services and help to ensure clients that min-
imal responsibility standards have been met. 75 Reinsch also stated that
167. See Allard & Kass, supra note 155, at 576.
168. Id.
169. See supra, notes 14-15 and accompanying text; John Simons & David Bank,
Restrictions Are Relaxed on Encryption Exports, WALL ST.J., Sept. 17, 1998, available in
1998 WL-WSJ 18984704.
170. See MIDDLEHURST, ET AL., supra note 6, at 555; Corcoran, supra note 32.
171. Study: U.S. Will Lose $35-95 Billion Due to Encryption Controls, 12 NEW
TECH. WK., Apr. 13, 1998, available in 1998 WL 9047819 (hereinafter Study). See also
James B. Altman & William McGlone, Demystifying U.S. Encryption Export Controls, 46
AM.U.L.REv. 493, 510 (1996). The Commerce Department estimated that by the end of
1997 there were 656 different types of encryption products available in 29 countries. Ad-
ministration's Encryption Policy Is "Failure, " Secy. Daley Admits, TR DAILY, Apr. 15,
1998, available in 1998 WL 6571617 (hereinafter Administration).
172. Study, supra note 171, at 510.
173. Id.
174. Symposium, Q: Should Uncle Sam Control U.S. Encryption Technology Ex-
ports? SUBH: Yes: Export Controls Will Help Maintain U.S. Market Share of Future En-
cryption Products, INSIGHT MAGAZINE (Sept. 8, 1997) (hereinafter Symposium). However,
see supra the text accompanying note 27 for a more recent statement by William Reinsch
in regards to the license exception given to Cylink which seems contradictory in that the
exception permits Cylink to export without promising key recovery.
175. Id.
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encryption products are going to be most in demand when the infrastruc-
tures within which they can function are in existence and that un-
restricted sales abroad will not make businesses more competitive. 176
While key recovery may indeed lend some credibility to an encryption
product, encryption's greatest asset to consumers and to electronic com-
merce is that it makes business transactions more secure and eliminates
concerns that private information may end up in the hands of criminals.
Therefore, as long as the United States restricts the exportation of the
strongest encryption within products while other countries do not, it is
likely that U.S. companies will lose market share to foreign corporations
which will force U.S. companies to either not participate in foreign mar-
kets or use foreign encryption products in order to do so.
B. Legislative Proposals
In response to these criticisms, various members of Congress have
proposed their own solutions to reform the encryption exportation regula-
tions. Some of these bills are designed to loosen controls while others
would make the exportation of encryption more difficult. One of the
most prominent is H.R. 695, the Security and Freedom through Encryp-
tion (SAFE) Act.177 As originally introduced in 1997, this bill proposed
removing encryption software from current U.S. export controls. 17 The
original bill would have prohibited mandatory key escrow, allowed
Americans to use any encryption software, placed export control with the
Commerce Department, allowed encryption software to be exported if
similar products were available overseas and made the use of encryption
for criminal purposes illegal. 79 However, as this bill made its way
through the five committees that have jurisdiction over encryption, vari-
ous restrictions upon exportation were added to create what were essen-
tially entirely new and diametrically opposite versions of the original
bill. I8 0
One of these committee amendments was the Oxley/Manton propo-
sal which represented the FBI's position and would have required encryp-
tion software to include key recovery techniques for police investigators
through a "backdoor."'' 1 This contradictory version of the SAFE bill
176. Id.
177. H.R. 695, 105th Cong. (1997).
178. John Rendleman, Encryption Conniption: E-Commerce Users and Vendors De-
cry Effort to lighten Controls, INTERNET WEEK, Sept. 22, 1997, at 1, 76. The bill was in-
troduced by Congressman Goodlatte (R-Va.). Machlis, supra note 150, at 16.
179. Machlis, supra note 150, at 16.
180. Rendleman, supra note 178, at 1, 76.
181. Jim Barksdale, Washington May Crash the Internet Economy, WALL ST. J.,
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which has been sarcastically referred to by opponents as the "UNSAFE"
bill would have required all encryption products, even those sold or dis-
tributed in the United States after January 31, 2000, to include a key re-
covery system. 8 2 This proposal and others that are similar have been ad-
vocated by law enforcement agencies but vigorously opposed by private
industry and privacy advocates.'83
One of the least restrictive proposals was put forward by Senator
Conrad Burns from Montana. His proposal would have limited the enact-
ment of. any regulation resulting in encryption standards to those systems
operated by the federal government. 184 The proposal would also have pro-
hibited regulations intended to impose government-designed encryption
standards on the private sector.'85 Finally, the proposal would have pro-
hibited regulations that restrict the sale of any product with encryption
capabilities or that require that encryption products contain a mandatory
key escrow system as a condition of sale. 18 6
By the end of September 1998, no versions of the SAFE bill or any
of the other bills had made it to the floor of the House and similar legis-
lation was stalled in the Senate. 187 Even though all of the bills have
stalled in committees, they do have some things in common. For in-
stance, they would increase the penalties for the use of encryption for il-
legal activities and would leave control over encryption exportation with
the Commerce Department. However, these similarities are minor in
comparison to the number of other areas of disagreements and the con-
flicting viewpoints held in respect to those areas. The biggest obstacle in-
volves the disagreements over the possibility of a mandatory key escrow
Sept. 26, 1997, at A22, also available in 1997 WL-WSJ 14167840. Another potential
problem that may result from the FBI plan is more crime. See id. The FBI proposal
"would expose computer users to assault by hackers intent on economic espionage,
blackmail and public humiliation." Id. For example at one congressional hearing, a wit-
ness testified that "with $1 billion and 20 people using existing technology, he could ef-
fectively shut down the nation's information infrastructure, including all computer, phone
and banking networks. Another witness said he could do it for $100 million." Id.
182. Alan J. Hoffman & Eric H. Vance, Sides Debate Future of Encryption: Easy
Answers Hard to Find Privacy Advocates, Law Enforcement at Odds, N.Y.L.J., July 13,
1998, at S7.
183. See, e.g., Rendleman, supra note 178, at 12. However, the FBI's position does
have its supporters in Congress. Senator Dianne Feinstein (D-California) has stated that
"nothing other than some kind of mandatory key recovery really does the job" and that
key recovery products should be mandatory domestically as well as internationally. Pie-
trucha, supra note 5.
184. Allard & Kass, supra note 155, at 578.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 579.
187. Kerstetter, supra note 2, at 16.
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system, with whom keys would be placed, and when they would be
given to the government. Many people are opposed to mandatory key es-
crow systems and are wary of placing the keys in the hands of the gov-
ernment or third parties because of the potential for misuse.'88 Although
the government has stated that it does not want direct control of the
keys, preferring instead for third parties to control the keys, 189 many peo-
ple in private industry as well as privacy advocates are adamantly op-
posed to any form of mandatory key escrow.' 9° However, privacy advo-
cates and industry are themselves not always in complete agreement.
Many in private industry seem more willing to make some concessions
which are not supported by privacy advocates.' 9' Most people in private
industry are willing to accept provisions that would make it a crime to
use encrypted communications in the commission of a felony, whereas,
most privacy advocates find this unacceptable. 192 Privacy advocates such
as Ms. Sehgal of the ACLU argue that it is unconstitutional to "create [a
crime that is] based on the use of technology where the crime [itself] is
not related to the technology." 191
Another area of disagreement is that some people within the govern-
ment want real-time access to all encrypted data without having to notify
the user.194 They argue that this would essentially allow the government
to access such encrypted communications after obtaining a court order, a
practice that is similar to what is currently done with telephones. 95 How-
ever, there is a fear within private industry that requiring real-time access
would hinder the rise of electronic commerce. 96
188. Id. at 16, 18.
189. Symposium, supra note 174, at 151. "The Clinton Administration consistently
has stated that the government does not wish to hold the keys to encrypted communica-
tions." Id.
190. Kerstetter, supra note 2, at 16. Many in the computer industry have pointed
out that any key escrow system is bound to create problems. They worry that key escrow
systems are susceptible to criminal hacking efforts and also that employees of escrow
companies themselves might also be able to steal crucial keys either to sell to criminals
or as the result of blackmailing efforts. John J. Fried, Code of Contention, Controversy
Over Internet Encryption Has Factions Deciphering Issues of Privacy, Crime And Secur-
ity, HOUSTON CHRON., Apr. 24, 1998, available in 1998 WL 3573510.
191. See Alan Cohen, Sides Talk Compromise, But Encryption Policy Lags, Dead-
lock May Be Harder to Break Than Codes Themselves, 219 N.Y.L.J. at S3 (1998).
192. Id.
193. Id. The creation of this type of offense has the potential for being a very pow-
erful weapon fot a prosecutor in a plea bargain. Id.
194. See, e.g., Kerstetter, supra note 2, at 16.
195. Id. See Stender, supra note 4.
196. See, e.g., id.
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Addressing these concerns is one of the most recent bills, S.2067,
that was introduced by Senators Patrick Leahy (D-Vermont) and John
Ashcroft (R-Missouri). 197 This bill, called the E-Privacy Act, would per-
mit U.S. companies to export products, as well as most software and
hardware, containing strong encryption without key recovery require-
ments as long as there is a competing foreign product that is already or
imminently available. 198 The bill would also not place any restrictions
upon the use of any level of encryption within the United States199 Fur-
thermore, the bill would create a National Electronic Technologies Center
which would assist law enforcement agencies in obtaining expertise in
encryption technology.200 Although the bill prohibits the mandatory es-
crow of decryption keys, it does allow law enforcement officials access
to decryption keys under existing wiretap authority and would allow
them to obtain keys or third party assistance for remotely stored data
with a court order or subpoena.201 This bill is a compromise between the
interests of private industry and law enforcement agencies, because it al-
lows the industry to compete with foreign businesses by easing restric-
tions while simultaneously giving law enforcement officials the right to
obtain keys whenever they have probable cause.
V. ENCRYPTION CONTROLS OVERSEAS
The domestic issues surrounding the encryption regulations are not
the only concerns facing the U.S. government's export policy. Problems
will also arise if the United States implements regulations unilaterally
rather than as part of a broader multinational effort. 20 2 If regulations are
implemented unilaterally, they will be ineffective in controlling wide-
197. S.2067, 105th Cong. (1998). See, e.g., id. The bill contains a "mass market"
provision that would allow for encryption products to be exportable under a license ex-
ception if they are generally available off the Internet or retail shelves. Charlotte Dunlap,
E-Privacy Act: Would Allow U.S. Companies to Better Compete Abroad, COMPUTER RE-
SELLER NEWS, May 25, 1998, at 109, available in 1998 WL 11981745.
198. See, e.g., Bill Pietrucha, Senators Introduce New Encryption Bill To Ease Lim-
its, NEWSBYTES, May 12, 1998, available in 1998 WL 11721982.
199. See, e.g., Bill Pietrucha, Senators Introduce New Encryption Bill To Ease Lim-
its, NEWSBYTES, May 12, 1998, available in 1998 WL 11721982.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. "Because of the Internet's borderless nature, American officials have long ac-
knowledged that their plan [for "key escrow"] was workable only if most other countries
adopted similar systems. If not, people could simply route their communications through
countries with no restrictions." Edmund L. Andrews, Europe Rejects Computer Plan:
U.S. Wants Key to Crack Codes, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Oct. 9, 1997, at Cl, also
available in 1997 WL 3209807.
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spread use of strong encryption, U.S. companies will purchase encryption
products from overseas, and U.S. producers of encryption will lose busi-
ness to overseas competitors.2 3 The Clinton administration has realized
this and has attempted to coordinate U.S. action with that of other na-
tions by organizing meetings of encryption experts through the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in an effort to
obtain broader international acceptance of U.S. key escrow proposals. 2°4
But creating a global encryption policy is obviously easier said then
done. Currently there is not a consensus among nations as to what de-
gree, if at all, encryption should be regulated. 20 5 For example, although
33 countries have some controls over the exportation of encryption prod-
ucts, only a few countries agree with the United States that key escrow
should be included within encryption products.206 The United States also
extends its encryption controls to software that contains encryption, but is
one of only a few countries to do so. 20 7 It is therefore necessary to de-
scribe the current policies of other countries to determine the type and
scope of regulations that might be possible in the future.
203. Altman & McGlone, supra note 171, at 510. "At a more fundamental level,
the availability of cryptographic software outside the United States underscores the futil-
ity of overly restrictive unilateral export controls. In today's global marketplace, geo-
graphic boundaries present fewer and fewer barriers to trade. Thus, now that the business
world is linked electronically, U.S. restrictions arguably will drive the restricted activities
outside the United States without limiting the development or dissemination of the >con-
trolled' technology." Id. Currently a third of the sites run by non-U.S. companies are ca-
pable of 128-bit encryption. Encryption Ban "No Real Worry" Outside U.S. Business,
IRISH TIMES, Feb. 23, 1998, at 10, available in 1998 WL 6227838.
204. See, e.g., MIDDLEHURST, ET AL., supra note 6, at 557. But while Canada will
be hosting a meeting of the OECD this fall to set rules for electronic commerce, encryp-
tion issues are not on the agenda. Jill Vardy, Insecurity Complex: Promise of E-
Commerce Stalled by Paranoia as U.S. Fears Encryption Technology Could Fall Into
Criminal Hands, FIN. POST, May 2, 1998, at 12, available in 1998 WL 10760190.
205. Stewart A. Baker, Government Regulation of Encryption Technology: Fre-
quently Asked Questions, in DOING BuSINEsS ON THE INTERNET, at 287, 301-02 (PLI Pat-
ents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. G4-3988,
1996). The lack of consensus is understandable considering that at the end of 1997 there
were 656 different types of encryption products available in 29 countries. Administration,
supra note 171.
206. See Vardy, supra note 204. A recent survey of 230 countries by the Global In-
temet Liberty Campaign showed that eight nations are definitely in support of a key re-
covery system. Lisa S. Dean, U.S. Encryption Policy Difficult to Decode, SEATTLE TIMES,
Apr. 21, 1998, at B5, available in 1998 WL 3149397. The eight nations that also desire a
key recovery system are China, France, India, Israel, the Republic of Korea, Pakistan,
Russia and Singapore. Id.
207. See Vardy, supra note 204.
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France has some of Europe's toughest laws on encryption 2 8 and has
been supportive of key escrow policies for encryption. 2°9 For products
with encryption capabilities, French businesses are required to file with
the government. 210 There is also a proposed amendment in France that
would restrict the import, use or sale of encryption products unless an
encryption key is escrowed with an escrow agent that has been approved
by the French government.211 Great Britain and Israel are two other coun-
tries that favor encryption regulations. Britain also is supportive of key
escrow and has generally sided with the United States in supporting an
international regime for regulating data encryption. 21 2 Israel currently re-
quires a license for the import, export, production or use of any encryp-
tion product.213
Russia has also implemented a highly regulated framework for en-
cryption technology that requires licenses for most activities involving
encryption including the import of products with encryption capabili-
ties.214 This decree has been highly criticized within Russia for a number
of reasons, including concerns that it is over broad and a violation of
civil rights.215 But even though the Russian regulations may appear strin-
gent, there has been very little enforcement of the existing measures.216
In China, companies are required to obtain licenses in order to im-
port or export encryption. 217 The available evidence indicates that ap-
proval for the use of encryption products is not necessarily easy to ob-
tain. 218 However, China is not likely to join in an international consensus
on encryption policy given their past disagreements over arms prolifera-
tion and human rights practices and since they have not yet sent any rep-
resentatives to the major international meetings on encryption.219
Although Canada has historically had similar export regulations to
the United States and is the one country that encryption can be exported
to from the United States without a license, it is now considering imple-
208. Kimberly A. Strassel, Secret For Success: Europeans Unlock Encryption Mar-
ket, Thanks to U.S. Rules, WALL ST. J. EuR., June 30, 1998, at 1, available in 1998 WL-
WSJE 12725941.
209. BAKER, supra note 205, at 303.
210. MIDDLEHURST, ET AL., supra note 6, at 556.
211. Id.
212. See Andrews, supra note 202, at Cl.
213. Id. See Baker, supra note 205 at 303.
214. MIDDLEHURST, ET AL., supra note 6, at 556-57.
215. See id. at 557.
216. See BAKER, supra note 205, at 303.
217. Id. at 304.
218. See id. at 305.
219. See id.
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menting more liberal regulations that would allow for the exportation of
stronger levels of encryption. 20 As for key recovery, Canada is still de-
ciding whether to have it be discretionary or whether to make it
mandatory.221 In an attempt to resolve these dilemmas Canada has created
a task force to outline the potential levels of control while trying to bal-
ance the security concerns of law enforcement with the market demands
of businesses. 222 This task force, the Canadian Task Force on Electronic
Commerce, accepts public comments and solicits input on what direction
Canadian policy should take.223 Although Canada realizes that liberalizing
its export controls could bring about pressure from the United States, it
is also fearful of losing market share to European firms.224
In Japan, the government is currently studying the export problem
but is reportedly suspicious of key escrow which they view as a possible
method of allowing U.S. businesses to dominate the market for electronic
commerce. 225 The German government, like its Japanese counterpart, is
worried that U.S. business might dominate the market and that American
authorities might have improper access to data on German users.226 Ger-
many is also concerned that this access might violate Germany's laws on
data protection. 227
While the previous countries have been relatively open to the idea
of encryption regulations, if not key escrow, there are still some coun-
tries such as Ireland, Switzerland, and Finland which are very liberal to-
ward the use and regulation of encryption.228 Nevertheless, there are signs
that some of these governments are beginning to believe that interna-
tional coordination on an encryption policy is necessary to prevent the
widespread international deployment of strong encryption.229 Although it
is possible that this coordination might result in an international commer-
220. Canada Mulls Liberal Encryption Exports: Neighbor Wary of Irking United
States, 3 ELECTRONIC COMMERCE NEWS, Apr. 6, 1998, available in WL 7200513 (herein-
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cial key escrow system, this outcome is unlikely since such a system
would require an unprecedented degree of government coordination and
would need to provide a means for a foreign government to receive a
surveillance target's keys from a foreign escrow agent. 2 0 In addition, al-
though many countries in Europe and Asia believe in some form of key
escrow, they are working more closely with the software community than
is the U.S. government and appear to recognize the limits of access.231
Recently, the European Commission rejected proposals by the
United States that called for the creation of an international key escrow
system.232 The European Commission was concerned that the U.S. ap-
proach might threaten privacy, stifle the growth of electronic commerce,
and ultimately be ineffective because hackers might find new ways to
breach security.233 Even if a key escrow system were to be put in place,
the European Commission was not convinced that criminals could be en-
tirely prevented from using strong encryption. 234 Several European coun-
tries also do not like the idea of deferring to an American system that
might allow American companies to dominate the market for security
products. 235 However, the European Commission's action does not block
member countries from setting up key-based systems on their own. 23 6
Thus, it is still possible for the United States to work with individual Eu-
ropean nations, though this obviously does not go as far toward creating
a global policy regarding encryption as would a plan endorsed by the en-
tire European Union.
In addition to the critiques put forth by the European Commission,
another issue that will make it difficult for individual nations to come to
a key escrow agreement involves the dilemma of who would be responsi-
ble for holding the keys. There are several possibilities, each of which
contains its own inherent problems and limitations that would have to be
resolved before they could be successfully implemented. For example, it
seems unlikely that nations would allow any other nation to hold the
keys for businesses located outside of their nation. Another possibility is
that the keys could be divided and given to the different nations in-
volved. Although, this would presumably prevent the inappropriate use of
the keys, it would also require a great deal of interaction between the na-
230. Id. at 307.
231. Jim Kerstetter, Encryption Battle Not as Heated Overseas, PC WEEK, Oct. 6,
1997, at 35.
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tions because both nations would have to agree when to use the keys and
would therefore probably result in a level of bureaucracy that would be
unduly burdensome. A third possibility is that the keys could be placed
in the possession of an international agency, though once again the prob-
lem arises that many countries would not agree to give up control of the
keys.
These difficulties are obviously a major setback to the Clinton ad-
ministration's effort to establish a global key escrow system. As is the is-
sue of how to deal with those nations who are opposed to exportation
regulations and those who do not want to cooperate in an international
setting. With this setting of disagreement and suspicion, it is unlikely that
a consensus will arise among most nations in the near future. But as the
U.S. government has acknowledged, if the export restrictions are going to
be successful, something must be done on a global scale relatively
soon.237 Although the United States acknowledges the necessity of coor-
dinating policies with foreign governments if future regulations are to be
successful, the United States continues to put together a "mosaic of regu-
lations" that lets some companies sell sophisticated products to certain
users under certain conditions.238 While these piecemeal approaches pro-
duce some beneficial results, they do not eliminate the eventual need for
exportation regulations to be coordinated with those of other countries if
the regulations are to be effective in the long-run.
VI. A MULTI-TIERED INTERNATIONAL APPROACH
Because of the widespread international availability of advanced en-
cryption algorithms, the United States can no longer control, to the same
degree that did in the past, the encryption strength used and acquired by
the rest of the world. As encryption use spreads further, unilateral ap-
proaches by individual countries will become unworkable, and an inter-
national consensus will be required if future encryption regulations are
going to succeed. Furthermore, given the conflicting interests of civil lib-
ertarians, businesses, and law enforcement, the differing importance of
each of these groups within each country, and the dissimilar treatment of
237. Undersecretary of Commerce William Reinsch has conceded that the exporta-
tion ban on encryption software is on shaky ground because U.S. policy has not been
backed by foreign governments. Reinsch also stated that "if we can't get our allies to do
the same kind of thing we're doing, in a year or so we'll have to review this." Encryp-
tion Export Ban Tested; But Shipments Across Europe May Violate U.S. Law, BALTIMORE
SuN, Mar. 21, 1998, at 15C, also available in 1998 WL 4957233.
238. Elizabeth Corcoran, Breakthrough Possible in Battle Over Encryption Technol-
ogy, WASH. POST, July 12, 1998, at A8, available in 1998 WL 11591560.
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encryption by countries in the past, it is difficult to imagine that any one
rigid level of encryption could be agreed upon for all types of transac-
tions in all countries.
A multi-tiered approach is therefore more realistic than a unilateral
one and has a better chance of meeting diverse national and local busi-
ness objectives. To be successful a multi-tiered approach should have
well-defined categories based upon the type of user, the country of desti-
nation, and the value of the message content. Such an approach would be
more appealing to other nations and more likely to gain international ap-
proval because it is inherently better suited to accommodating the differ-
ing needs and concerns of the various nations. Consensus could be built
by having an international organization or conference work out the spe-
cifics of each tier. One possible plan is presented below and would en-
compass three tiers representing different security requirements.
A. The First Tier
The first and strongest encryption tier would allow at least those
service industries for which the U.S. government presently has granted
exceptions, such as financial, medical, and insurance to use the highest
level of encryption possible without requiring either key escrow or a
backdoor. This use would be subject to strict guidelines that are compre-
hensive and explicit. Before being permitted to use the encryption, busi-
nesses could be required to register what they are using the encryption
for and the various localities in which they will be using it. This is simi-
lar to what is currently being allowed both by the United States and else-
where but would have the advantage, at least in the United States, of
making the regulations controlling such use uniform and explicit rather
than being administered and changed on an ad hoc basis.
B. The Second Tier
The second tier would include stand-alone encryption used interna-
tionally by private industry. This tier would be a hybrid of the first and
third tiers and allow a level of encryption, such as 96-bit, that is stronger
than the third tier but weaker than the first. The owners of such encryp-
tion would be required to register with their respective countries. This
tier would allow businesses that do not qualify for the first tier to use a
level of encryption that would allow them to keep their trade secrets and
communications confidential. Each country could require that the busi-
nesses located within its territory use some form of key escrow and that
communications between businesses of different nations use key escrow
if one of the respective countries requires the use of key escrow. A coun-
try normally requiring key escrow would be able to enter into bi-lateral
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agreements with other countries that would allow the businesses of the
two countries to communicate with one another without the use of key
escrow, such as is currently being done between the United States and
Canada. This approach is more likely to appeal to governments, because
it would allow them to decide when key escrow would be required and
for which countries, but would still provide benefits to industry by pre-
sumably allowing them greater flexibility in their exports to more nations
than under the current regulations by decreasing the number of countries
for which licenses would be required. In terms of product development,
this approach may cause difficulties, because for some countries key es-
crow would be required while for others it would not be, thus creating
the need for a product that would be able to either use or not use key es-
crow from one application to the next.
There are however, other possibilities as to how this mid-level se-
curity tier might be structured. Recently, a coalition of high-technology
companies announced a plan, dubbed the "private doorbell," that could
comprise the second tier.239 In its current form this plan affects private
companies and Internet service providers who serve as gateways for man-
aging the electronic messages sent by their employees or their subscrib-
ers.240 Under the "private doorbell" plan, law enforcement officers fol-
lowing a warrant could pull out specific messages either just before the
product or network scrambles outgoing mail or just after the incoming
mail is deciphered. 24'
This plan would therefore prevent both the government and outside
hackers from intercepting the data while it is in transit either over the In-
ternet or a private network using the companies' products.242 While the
plan is supported by many in the U.S. business sector, it is not known
whether other national governments would agree to such a plan. As for
the United States government, the Commerce Department has stated that
the plan "raises serious issues that must be considered. ' 243 For instance,
the plan does not address the issue of how the networks will protect the
messages from outside hackers and corrupt employees while they are in
their less protected state.244 Furthermore, for overseas communications,
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authorities as well as the relevant network managers in order to access
information. 245 This is similar to what law enforcement currently has to
do when they monitor telephone calls. 24 6 Although U.S. domestic law en-
forcement agencies appear willing to accept this proposal, the National
Security Agency (NSA) has expressed strong opposition to the plan be-
cause it currently can eavesdrop on overseas communications without ob-
taining permission from anyone. 247 Government agencies are also not the
only groups that have expressed their concern over the proposal. Privacy
advocates have criticized the "doorbell" approach as being more useful
to big businesses than to ordinary Internet users.2 48 These issues will
have to be resolved before approval of the plan, a process that is likely
to take quite some time given the nature of the debate and the concerns
that the government has about the plan.
C. The Third Tier
The third tier would include users of mass market telecommunica-
tions such as telephones, faxes, and e-mail that would be limited to 56-
bit encryption. This would be enough protection for most ordinary, non-
criminal uses of such technology and provide a sufficient deterrent to
non-government interception of these communications. 249 Such a level of
encryption would provide more security then is typically currently used
for such communications while not an overly high level that the govern-
ment would not be able to crack it if it were deemed necessary to do so.
This tier would also include some form of universal key escrow since it
would be more acceptable to the international community then would key
escrow for the first tier or second tier. Limiting the level of encryption to
56-bits for this tier does not mean that the users within this tier have
fewer rights than those in tier one or tier two. Rather, it is a compromise
position that acknowledges that the reasons for allowing persons within
tier three stronger encryption are not as persuasive as are the reasons for
providing those in the first two tiers, since the incentives for hacking the
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consequences of a successful hacking are arguably not as severe in tier
three.
VII. CONCLUSION
The exportation of encryption is currently governed by a complex
and confusing set of regulations that produces arbitrary results and may
also violate the First Amendment. Even though it is likely that the First
Amendment concerns will be resolved by the courts in a manner that will
relax the current controls, the Presidential administration and Congress, if
they so desire, could maintain the same level of export restrictions by in-
cluding more procedural safeguards within the licensing process. But, not
only do the current regulations suffer from this malady, they are also the
target of other criticisms from parties familiar with the debate. Many in
the computer industry would like to have less comprehensive regulations,
while law enforcement agencies such as the FBI and the NSA would pre-
fer restrictions that would allow them access to all encrypted communi-
cations, both domestic and foreign. Although there are groups between
these two extremes, there has yet to arise a consensus on what future
regulations should encompass. Instead the government and industry seem
intent on proposing piecemeal approaches that are designed to only ad-
dress specific areas of the impasse. The sheer number and breadth of
these continuous proposals are indicative of how quickly this field is
changing and of how difficult it will be for the various sides to come to
an agreement.
Complicating matters even further is that any unilateral action taken
by the United States is unlikely to be successful. Currently international
uniformity does not exist and while a multi-tiered approach might pro-
vide a way to overcome this, it does not appear as if the present impasse
is going to change in the near future. The complexity and confusing na-
ture of the U.S. regulations and the lack of uniformity among regulations
worldwide is unfortunate because it creates an atmosphere of uncertainty.
This uncertainty is undesirable from a business perspective because it
forces companies to make decisions based upon fluctuating worldwide
market conditions. Such a situation may ultimately either leave compa-
nies vulnerable to liability by unknowingly violating U.S. or foreign en-
cryption regulations or even compel them to forgo legal exports because
of complicated and costly regulations.
E. Franklin Haignere
[Vol. 22
